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REVENUE SHARING-AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS
COME-ALMOST!
ARTHUR D. LYNN, JR.*

& DALE L. MC GIRR**

MARKS the twentieth year of publication for the
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW and provides an appropri-

ate occasion indeed for a review of Federal-State
relations in American federalism. As one element of this symposium,
this paper considers current policy concerns about revenue sharing, an
idea whose time has come-almost!1 At the moment a riot inconsiderable variety of fiscal proposals parade under the caption of
revenue sharing; however, the basic idea is simply the sharing of revenue by the national government with some set of subfederal governments in order to strengthen their fiscal capabilities. In other
words, revenue sharing amounts to the award of federal, unconditional---or relatively unconditional-grants to subnational governmental units with the grant amounts being a function of, or related
to, particular revenue yields rather than, or in addition to, the categorical or functional grants that have prolifereated so rapidly since
this Journal began twenty years ago. Consideration of this topic includes: (1) causes for revenue sharing proposals; (2) the cases for
and against the concept of revenue sharing that have developed duiring the nine-year seasoning period that has passed since the idea
first attracted national attention; and (3) the evolving compromises
that appear to be on the verge of producing a consensus that may
result in legislative action which will make revenue sharing an integral component of the fiscal pattern of federalism in the United
States.
* Professor of Economics and Public Administration, Adjunct Professor of
Law, The Ohio State University; President, National Tax Association, 1969-70;
Member Ohio and U.S. Supreme Court Bars.
**
Research Associate, Division of Public Administration, The Ohio State University.
1. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REVENUE
SHARING-AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME, Information Report M-54 (December,
1970).
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REVENUE SHARING
THE FISCAL IMBALANCE CRISIS

Financing American federalism has seldom been easy and has almost always generated debate. The recent past and our present
situation provide no exception to this generalization. Economic
growth causes increases in federal tax revenues because of the progressive rate structure of the federal tax system. Simultaneously,
the by-products of such growth creates new and additional program
requirements for state and local governments without materially increasing their revenue-raising capacity. Few of the congeries of
contemporary problems fail to contribute their fair share to increased governmental costs. The result is an imbalance between
fiscal needs and resources at the subnational level where there is
no fiscal policy justification for unbalanced budgets.
This "fiscal mismatch" of needs and resources creates a continuing fiscal crisis at the state and local level. Moreover, the state
and local governments' capacity to effectively respond to this problem is often further reduced by the fragmentation of local government units and the existing distribution of legal authority between
state and local governments.2 This state of affairs provides one
rational basis for revenue sharing proposals designed to provide
subnational governments access to that magnificent fiscal engine,
the federal income tax.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS:
SEARCH FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM

Given the very real complexity of American federalism, a variety
of approaches to intergovernmental programming and fiscal coordination have developed both in practice and from academic discussions.
A sampling of approaches includes: (1) separation of tax sources;
(2) coordinated tax administration; (3) coordinated tax bases including tax supplements and credits; (4) centralized tax administration; (5) uniform laws; (6) functional grants-in-aid; (7) unconditional grants-in-aid; and (8) shifts in the locus of program or
functional responsibility. These approaches have generated much
debate and a corresponding prolific amount of literature almost ex2. See Lynn, Financing Modernized and Unmodernized Local Government in
the Age of Aquarius, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 30 (1971).
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ceeding the writings induced by the antitrust laws.' In this intellectual area, ancient political ideas interact with current arcane economic concepts and produce only one conclusion-no one grand
solution is either readily or obviously available. No single approach provides in and of itself a satisfactory solution to the fiscal
problems of federalism. Both the public and their policy-makers
are faced with the perennial question of what "mix" of policies
seem best at a particular time and what rate of incremental change
is appropriate. At the moment, the American federal system moves
in its own peculiar fashion at a rather glacial pace toward a new
fiscal balance. Analysis of this complex matter is clearly beyond
the scope of this article, although the emergent dimensions of new
arrangements merit passing notice since they, if and when adopted,
will serve to condition both prospects for enactment of revenue
sharing and what may reasonably be expected to result from its
existence as one element in the changing fiscal base of American
federalism. Recently, expert analysts of contemporary government
have suggested state assumption of the costs of public education
and federal government assumption of the fiscal burdens of public
assistance, including medicaid.4 While such proposals offend at
least some conventional wisdom, they do outline a genuine series
of possibilities that have obvious relevance for the changing design
of our fiscal system. We assume, at this point, the gradual fiscal
federalization of welfare. Also our reading of the aftermath of
Serrano v. Priest,5 suggests that states will remain under significant
pressure to accept increased direct responsibility for school finance.'
Within this evolving context, revenue sharing, while hardly a panacea and certainly lacking the capacity to solve many problems, may
3. See, e.g., BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1967); FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS (M. Walker, ed. 1968);
FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL TAX CORRELATION (M. Walker, ed. 1954); FEDERAL, STATE,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS, S. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
4.

See ADVISORY

COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 17-18 (1969); and BUHL, State Taxes, Expenditures, and the Fiscal Plight of the Cities, in THE STATES AND THE URBAN

AMERICA

CRISIS 113 (1970).
5. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
6. See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 1355 (1971), and CooNs, CLUNE, AND SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
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well be an acceptable but second-best solution to many of our intergovernmental fiscal problems. 7 It does seem to be an appropriate
means of revitalizing the federal system and increasing the range
of options available." It can appropriately be included as one element contributing to a new balance in fiscal federalism. While
natura non facit saltum remains accurately descriptive of our public
policy decision-making pattern, revenue sharing seems an appropriate next, but by no means final step. This tentative conclusion
suggests the merit of examining the background and the pros and
cons of revenue sharing as a prelude to a final evaluation of the
concept.
REVENUE SHARING:

A SUMMARY OF PAST DEVELOPMENTS

While federal fiscal aid to state and local governments is virtually as old as the nation, Congress has rather consistently attached conditions to or limited the scope of particular grant programs.' Unconditional transfers have been rare, if not altogether
unknown in American fiscal history. 10 Current consideration of
revenue sharing began in 1964 when Walter Heller, then Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisors, proposed revenue sharing
as a device to permit the states to receive the benefit of anticipated
federal "fiscal dividends" in order to help correct the fiscal drag."
What has come to be known as the Heller-Pechman plan for revenue sharing had marked attractiveness and appeared to receive
endorsement from both sides of the political aisle. 1 2 While all com7. Break, Revenue Sharing: Priorities and Policy Instruments, 23 J. OF FIN.
251-63 (May, 1968).
8. See Lynn, Revenue Sharing and the New Federalism, XVII REVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCALI 1106 (1970).
9. Hellerstein, Current Issues in Fiscal Federalism: Federal Grants-In-Aid,
20 U. FLA. L. REV. 510 (1968).

10.
11.

See BOURNE, THE HISTORY OF THE SURPLUS REVENUE OF 1837 (1885).
See Nathan, The Tax Sharing Approach in FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FISCAL

supra note 3, at 108; Brazer, The Federal Government and StateLocal Finances, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 156 (1967).
12. See Heller, Strengthening the Fiscal Base of Our Federalism, in NEW
DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1966); and JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,
RELATIONSHIPS,

REVENUE SHARING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES:

90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

WHAT FUTURE FOR FISCAL FEDERALISM?
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ment was by no means favorable,"3 the concept was readily assimilated to the conventional wisdom of the times.
Walter Heller described his proposal in the Godkin Lectures as
follows:
In capsule, the revenue-sharing plan would distribute a specified portion of the
Federal individual income tax to the states each year on a per capita basis,
with next to no strings attached. This distribution would be over and above existing and future conditional grants.14

After some five years of public discussion, President Nixon sent
Congress a plan for revenue sharing in August, 1969 which, if
adopted as proposed, would have established a distribution increasing in amount over time to one percent of federal personal taxable
income. This transfer to state and local governments would have
been based on population ratios and tax efforts of the various states
with an automatic distribution to local governments based upon the
ratio of state to local government revenue raised in a particular
state. All cities, towns and counties would have shared in this intergovernmental transfer payment pattern, but special purpose districts were excluded. 15 Subsequently, amid a plethora of discussion, a wide variety of revenue sharing proposals have been made.
The suggestions vary, as might be expected, in terms of: (1) amount;
(2) duration, (3) distribution formula, (4) participation by particular
local government units-e.g., the "pass through" problem, (5) the
scope of expenditure control and the appropriate objects of expenditure
-the "strings" or "no strings" question, and finally, (6) the ancillary
requirements attached, such as modernization of state and local government structure or improvement of subnational government revenue
systems, as conditions precedent to receipt of some or all of the revenue shared. At the time of this writing, the media suggests that these
matters not only can, but shortly will, be compromised and that the
House Ways & Means Committee of the Congress will soon approve a
13. See e.g., Anderson, The Myths of Tax Sharing, 28 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REV. 10 (1968); Ulmer, Tax Sharing Versus Rational Decision Making, in
FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 3, at 179.
14.
15.

HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra

note 12, at 145.
See The President's Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, August
8, 1969 in WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 5 (August 11, 1969)
1077, 1103-1109; see also STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE, H.R. Doc. 1, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
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compromise bill to provide $3.5 billion for local governments and
up to $1.8 billion to states for five years annually.1" If this prediction is correct, our assumption, that the variations in earlier proposals can be productively compromised, will be confirmed. Time
will tell. Meanwhile, the balance of this article will use H.R. 11950,
92d Congress, 1st Session, entitled the "Intergovernmental Fiscal
Coordination Act of 1971," as the basis for discussion and refer
to it as the Mills Bill. First, however, the pros and cons of the
basic idea merit notice.
THE CASE FOR REVENUE SHARING

As already indicated, the core idea of revenue sharing includes:
(1) setting aside a percentage of the federal individual income tax
base; (2) automatically allocating this sum to the states annually
to be spent by them without material restriction; (3) this amount to
be distributed on a formula basis using population and some meas17
ure of tax effort with some distribution to local governments.
What are the arguments in favor of such an arrangement? Walter
Heller has well stated one aspect of the matter as follows:
In a basic sense, the case for shared taxes begins with the conviction that strong
and financially viable states (interpreted to mean 'state-local governments') are
essential to (a) a healthy federalism and (b) optimality in the performance of
public services.
In part, this simply expresses the traditional faith in pluralism and decentralization,
diversity, innovation, and experimentation. For those who lack that faith-for
died-in-the-wool Hamiltonians and for those who believe that the states are bound
to wither away-there can be little attraction in revenue sharing or other instruments relying heavily on local discretion and decision.
Yet, apart from the philosophic virtues of federalism, all of us have a direct stake
in the financial health of state-local governments for the simple reason that they
perform the bulk of essential civilian services in the country.18

Thus, one justification for revenue sharing is that it would nourish state-local programs, thereby making for effective subnational
governments as well as enabling economically weaker states to provide adequate minimum service levels. As has been suggested else16. Wall Street Journal, March 16, 1972, at 3, col. 1. See note 32 in/ra.
17. Pechman, Revenue Sharing Revisited in FINANCING STATE AND

LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Monetary Conference 11-12, June,

1970.
18.' Heller, A Sympathetic Reappraisal of Revenue Sharing in REVENUE SHARING AND THE CITY 17 (1968).
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where, "Nevertheless, revenue sharing seems to be an appropriate
means of loosening up the system and increasing the range of options open to subfederal governmental jurisdictions in the American federal system." 19 Another justification for revenue sharing
is that it is anticentralist and thus, supports traditional power diffusion and deconcentration. 2 1 Certainly, it would assist in balancing state budgets-a by no means unimportant factor.2 '
Economist George Break has provided one apt as well as succinct statement of the case for revenue sharing in these words:
The basic case for the adoption of revenue sharing at this time rests on the
proposition that state and local governments are presently unable, for reasons
beyond their control, to provide the level of local and regional public service
benefits that their residents really would like to purchase, or that today's societies
regard as an absolute minimum. There are three major potential barriers to the
optimal provision of local public service benefits in a federal system of government:
1. Because they operate in relatively open economic environments, subnational
governments may be deterred from raising tax rates by fear of generating adverse
migration effects.
2. State and local voters may be unable to agree on the appropriate mix of
benefits-received and ability-to-pay elements in the taxes needed to finance the
programs they desire.
3. Specific state and local governments may lack the resources needed to support
those levels of local public service that a large majority of the people in the
22
country would regard as the minimum required for civilized existence.

With this the case for revenue sharing can rest. Revenue sharing, while no panacea, accords with federalism, offsets the fiscal
mismatch, provides limited interstate equalization and, in effect,
strengthens the federal system. In a larger sense, as former Secretary
John B. Connally has suggested, it is a reaffirmation of faith in
American federalism and in the American people.2"
THE CASE AGAINST REVENUE SHARING:
FORCEFUL CHALLENGES TO THE IDEA

Opposition to adoption of revenue sharing finds justification in
19. Supra note 8.
20. Agnew, The Case for Revenue Sharing, 60 GEO. L.J. 7 (1971).
21. See Rockefeller, Revenue Sharing-A View from the Statehouse, 60 GEo.
L.J. 45 (1971).
22. Break, Revenue Sharing: Its Implications for Present and Future Intergovernment FiscalSystems: The Case For, 24 NAT'L TAX J.307 (1971).
23. Connally, A Cabinet Member's Viewpoint on Fiscal Federalism, 24 NAT'L
TAX J.303, 306 (1971).
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a variety of ideas ranging from a fear of federal dominance of local
affairs to the presumed superiority of categorical grants compared
to the unconditional variety.2 4 At least some of these arguments
merit review. Ancient wisdom suggests the propriety of tax levy
and expenditure decisions at and by the same level of government.
Separating the two, as commonly suggested, will separate right
from responsibility and lead to decisional profligacy by the spending unit. There is, of course, much good sense in this view; however, it is difficult to argue convincingly that federal policymakers
now exercise effective expenditure control especially in the meaningfully labelled "uncontrollable" areas of the federal budget. It is
at least no more difficult to contend that state and local officials
would clearly recognize that waste of revenue sharing funds would
require higher taxes and the political accountability that such decisions entail. Moreover, some expenditure constraints will doubtlessly be added to whatever revenue sharing arrangement is ultimately adopted and one should not be without some considerable
faith in the Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office.
A more effective criticism is simply that there is no uncommitted
federal fiscal dividend either now or in the foreseeable future and
that, in effect, there is nothing to share; or to put it more accurately,
that there are more pressing national priorities such as federalization of fiscal responsibility for welfare and income maintenance as
well as federal financial responsibility for a minimum program component of elementary and secondary education. This observation
may be and often is coupled with the fact that some states have excessive needs and low incomes, while others have high incomes with
included low-income problem enclaves. 2" George Break once again
provides an effective rejoinder:
My conclusion, however, is that we need both aid to poor people and aid to poor

governments, that income maintenance programs are capable of achieving only
the former goal, and that revenue sharing, in a form not very different from
the original Heller-Pechman plan, is a simple and reasonably effective means of
24. See e.g., Anderson, A Tax Sharing Proposal Analyzed, 34 TAX POLICY 3-8
(1967).
25. Musgrave and Polinsky, Revenue Sharing: A Critical View, 8 HARV. J.
Also see the cautious but effective analysis of Oldman, ObLEGIS. 197 (1971).
jectives in Fixing Revenue and Expenditure Responsibilities, With ParticularEmphasis on Federally Motivated State Tax Reform, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 291 (1971).
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raising the level of public service consumption to acceptable standards for people
26
who otherwise would not be able to achieve them.

Moreover, while national problems require action, our public institutions, including state and local government, clearly must be
equipped to perform their basic functions as well as provide "service stations" to which the federal government can delegate the implementation of various programs. Overcoming advanced obsolescence in public institutions is in itself a matter of considerable priority.
Numerous other alleged negative by-products of the adoption of
revenue sharing have been noted by critics and analysts.2
However, adoption of revenue sharing hardly seems likely to seriously
undermine the categorical grants system. The common argument
that states should pay their own way and that revenue sharing will
create a dependency, have elements of truth yet seem basically
unpersuasive. Revenue sharing is seldom touted as the best or a
perfect solution to fiscal imbalance; it is merely the best of the worst. 28
Accordingly, in our view, the weight of the argument favors early
adoption of the revenue sharing concept.
THE MATTER OF CUTTING UP THE PIE: DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS

At the time of this writing, a tentative consensus on the details
of revenue sharing appears to be developing. 29 Basic questions
concerning alternative revenue sharing proposals include: (1) the
method of determining annual amounts to be shared; (2) determining the formula for distribution of shared funds to recipient governments; (3) specifying the share, if any, of local governments; (4)
the matter of what restrictions (strings) will be placed on the expenditure of such funds; and lastly (5) the question of what ancillary
conditions will be required for qualification as a recipient.3 0 These
issues appear well on the way to resolution.
26. Break, Discussion in FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra note
17, at 54.
27. Corman, Grave Doubts About Revenue Sharing, 60 GEO. L.J. 29 (1971);
Keyserling, Revenue Sharing: Its Implications for Present and Future Intergovernmental Fiscal Systems: The Case Against, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 313 (1971); HARRISS,
FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING: A NEW APPRAISAL (1969).

28.
29.
30.

See e.g., Turnbull, Federal Revenue Sharing, 29 MD. L. REV. 344 (1969).
The New York Times, February 27, 1972, at 6E, col. 4. See note 32 infra.
For a comprehensive analysis see Weidenbaum and Joss, Alternative Ap-
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While initial revenue sharing proposals contemplated continuing
appropriations increasing over time, it now appears, as exemplified
by the Mills Bill, that a fixed dollar amount limited to a five-year
initial trial run of the revenue sharing idea is a more likely outcome. Similarly, although the Heller-Pechman proposals suggested
distribution on a per capita basis, they were adjusted for subnational government tax effort. Sections 102 and 103 of the proposed Intergovernmental Fiscal Coordination Act of 1971 (the
Mills Bill), for example, would distribute one-half on a population
basis and one-half on the basis of the recipient government's proportion of families with incomes under $4,000. This arrangement
weights the distribution in terms of need as measured by low family
income.
The Mills Bill would provide $3.5 billion for local governments
and $1.8 billion for state governments annually for a maximum of
five years. The local government share would be distributed, as
already indicated, on the basis of population adjusted for urbanism
and low-income families in the recipient jurisdiction. This, then, is
the response in this draft legislation to the problem of transferring
funds to the local governments. On balance, this appears to be an
effective and satisfactory resolution of the problem. It has already
attracted significant support from the nation's governors and may31

ors.

STRINGS, NO STRINGS, OR SOME STRINGS:
THE QUESTION OF FEDERAL CONTROL

These issues essentially consider who gets how much if revenue
sharing is adopted. Generally, the Mills Bill, while subject to further
modification in terms of the legislative process and the inevitable
compromises it entails,3 2 handles these matters in a realistic, effective,
proaches to Revenue Sharing: A Description and Framework for Evaluation, 23
NAT'L TAX J. 2 (1970).

31.

See e.g., Tax Sharing: Mills Plan vs. Nixon's, 72 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD

REPORT 51 (February 21, 1972).

32. As this article was going into print, these compromises had been worked out
in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, H 14370: "House-Senate conferees have reached agreement on the $30.1 billion five-year revenue sharing plan.
The funds would be divided one-third to states and two-thirds to local. The key
compromise came when it was decided to give state governments the option of
utilizing either the Senate rural-oriented or House urban-oriented distribution for-
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and appropriate fashion. The original Heller-Pechman plan and
the proposal urged by President Nixon were essentially unconditional grants to local governments; i.e., revenue sharing on a "nostrings-attached" basis. Inevitably the "no-strings" concept generates concern and opposition. From a Congressional standpoint, the
problem is insuring proper use of federal funds which are subject
to Congressional control and for the expenditure of which Congress is ultimately responsible, even though the absence of adequate
output measures renders program evaluation rather anemic if not
33
impotent.
From the viewpoint of subnational governments, especially when
they are poor, there are at least two relevant considerations. First,
there is the question of regional variation in priorities and problems. Uniformity is not necessarily a guarantor of program or expenditure effectiveness. Accordingly, some considerable delegation
of expenditure control appears desirable. Second, experience from
the categorical grants area suggests that rigid and particular specification of expenditures provide few, if any, incentives for local officials and administrators to be creative in designing and implementing effective programs. A basic dichotomy results. Congress seeks
to retain control in order to achieve national objectives; local units
naturally desire local control not only for its own sake but also in order
to acquire or retain the capacity for developing responsive, effective
mula. Local governments would use the funds according to the Senate formula for

maintenance operations, public safety, environmental protection, and public transportation." CCH CONG. INDEX, Report Letter No. 92, Sept. 27, 1972. See also
Strauss, Revitalizing Our Federal System: The Rationale for Revenue Sharing, in
this issue of the DE PAUL L. REV.

33. On this latter point Charles L. Schultze offers a telling comment as
follows: "Two major consequences flow from failure to provide performance measures related to program objectives.

The first is the growth of detailed regulations

which rigidly specify what is 'acceptable' behavior by subordinate decisionmakers.
Standard contract provisions multiply and are required to be included in all con-

tracts regardless of their suitability to a particular situation. Tables of organization are centrally established and carefully monitored. Elaborate procedures are

developed to control the purchase of supplies, the use of long-distance communications, travel, and the like. Since subordinate decisions cannot be controlled by
judging them in terms of their effect on output, they are controlled by a rigid specifi-

cation of inputs."
See Schultze, The Role of Incentives, Penalties, and Rewards in Attaining Effective Policy in HAVERMAN & MARGOLIS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS
152 (1970).
See also W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
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programs. In a sense, curing the fiscal mismatch entails effective
handling of the administrative power mismatch in contemporary
American federalism. Assuming a continuation of the present categorical grants system and its possible future expansion, adoption
of revenue sharing should allow for regional and local variation in
the implementation of national objectives so as to maintain and enhance the viability of the federal system.
The Mills Bill, which Congressman Mills has said represents his
efforts to find a satisfactory alternative to revenue sharing, 4 illustrates one approach to the "strings" or "no-strings" question. Section 101 provides that payments to local governments may be used
only for "high-priority expenditures" which are defined in part in
Section 102 as follows:
For purposes of this title, the term 'high-priority expenditures' means only(1) maintenance and operating expenses for(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection, and building code enforcement),

(2)

(B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sanitation, and
pollution abatement),
(C) public transportation (including transit systems and streets),
(D) youth recreation programs,
(E) health,
(F) financial administration, and
capital expenditures for(A) sewage collection and treatment,
(B) refuse disposal systems,
(C) public transportation (including transit systems and street construction),
(D)

the acquisition of open space for parks and public facilities, and

(E) urban renewal programs.

This proposed constraint provides one resolution to basic questions
about the scope of permissible expenditures from shared revenues.
It appears to be a realistic and acceptable compromise which maintains some reasonable local expenditure flexibility as well as federal
oversight.
A final area in the "strings" versus "no-strings" debate is the
question of what additional conditions, other than the usual postaudit procedures, must be met by a subnational government in order for it to qualify as a recipient of shared revenues or appropria34.

Press Release, Office of Congressman Wilbur D. Mills, November 30, 1971.
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tions made for transfers in lieu of revenue sharing per se. Naturally, a wide spectrum of conditions might be attached to legislation
of this type. Federal policy could insist upon some degree of state
and/or local government modernization and structural reorganization. Alternatively, it could provide incentives for significant
change in state revenue systems. Section 202 of the proposed Intergovernmental Fiscal Coordination Act adopts the latter approach
by providing that state allocations are to be limited to 15 percent
of the amount of revenue derived from the state individual income
tax during the previous year. Thus, states which refuse to impose
state income taxes would be ineligible for any federal revenuesharing funds. Optional federal collection of state income taxes is
also provided but will not be considered here, since it involves
numerous questions of intergovernmental tax coordination which
transcend the revenue sharing question."5 Since a personal income
tax is a logical component of a high quality state tax system, this
incentive proposal is an appropriate condition.
SUMMARY

Current debate on fiscal federalism and revenue sharing seems
to be moving toward a positive compromise, including adoption of
a modified form of revenue sharing or block grants with some
rather reasonable strings attached. 6 While precise prediction, especially in an election year, is premature, it does appear that revenue
sharing is an idea whose time has almost come. The proposed Intergovernmental Fiscal Coordination Act provides one acceptable
response to the 1964-1972 debate on revenue sharing; Enactment
of this proposal or a similar variation would make a useful and
needed contribution to the effective financing of American federalism.

35. See Title III, H.R. 11950, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); on this matter see
e.g., Conlon, Federal Participation in State Tax Administration, 24 NAT'L TAX J.
369 (1971) and Shannon, .4 High Quality State-Local Revenue System, Paper Presented to the National Municipal League, Atlanta, Georgia, November 15, 1971.

36.

For an excellent analysis of overall policy, see Pechman, Fiscal Federalism

for the 1970's, 24 NAT'L TAx J. 281, 286-287 (1971).

